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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, written over two hundred years ago, guarantees Americans one of the
most basic of human rights, freedom of expression.1 Contrastly,
Great Britain, the country from whom the United States derived
both the basis of its legal system and passion for liberty, lacks any
legislatively or constitutionally guaranteed rights. 2 Although much
of Great Britain's former empire widely embraced the protections
I See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (describing freedom of
expression as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that freedom of
speech and the press "are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the [Constitution]").
Specifically, the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Although many Americans believe freedom of expression is the bedrock upon which
the founding fathers built this country, freedom of speech and the press were in reality last-ditch political concessions. J. Louis Campbell III, From Small Acorns Mighty Oaks
Grow: The Legislatures and Free Speech in Colonial Connecticut and Rhode Island, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3, 3-5 (Thomas L. Tedford et al. eds., 1987); see also
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 234 (1985) (stating that by promising a
bill of rights, including freedom of the press, the drafters of the Constitution helped
guarantee approbation by crucial states where ratification was in doubt).
One commentator has pointed out that there is disagreement in the scholarly
community regarding the intended purpose of the First Amendment. EDwARD L. BARRETr, JR. ET AL., CONSTITUIONAL LAw 1201 (8th ed. 1989). For example, some believe it was a simple grant of freedom. Id. The more modern view, however, supports
the position that the First Amendment was intended to delegate to the states the
power to regulate speech and the press, thereby restraining Congress from acting in
this area. Id. For a general discussion of free speech under the First Amendment, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-1 to -14, at 785-887 (2d ed.
1988).
2 SeeJohn A. Andrews, The EuropeanJurisprudenceOf Human Rights, 43 MD.L. REv.
463, 463 (1984) (noting that the only fundamental rights in the United Kingdom are
those established by Acts of Parliament or by judicial decisions); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion ofJudicialReview in England and the United States, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 644 (1986) (commenting that the absence of a written
constitution allows Parliament absolute sovereignty); see alsoJ. Skelly Wright, The Bill
of Rights in Britain and America: A Not Quite Full Circle, 55 TUL. L. REV. 291, 292 (1981)
(observing that Britain is the country "from whom we claim our love of liberty as well
as many of the provisions of our Bill of Rights").
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of the First Amendment in their own constitutions,' today Great
Britain offers its citizens no similar guarantees. 4 For example, libel5 laws in Great Britain do not offer the same protections af3 See Anthony Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated?, PUB. L.,
Spring 1984, at 46, 55, 56-57 [hereinafter Lester, FundamentalRights] (observing that
more than half of the 42 British Commonwealth countries and a majority of the remaining self-governed British dependent territories guarantee their citizens fundamental rights, including freedom of speech, in their constitutions); Anthony Lester,
The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537, 539 (1988)
[hereinafter Lester, The Overseas Trade] (stating that the British Commonwealth countries modelled their constitutions after the Convention On Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), which is in turn patterned after the
United States Constitution); see also Anthony Lester, The American Constitution: Home
Thoughts from Abroad, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 769, 771 (1988) [hereinafter Lester, The
American Constitution] (noting that the United States Constitution is "the grandfather
of most of the constitutions of the rest of the world").
The European Convention, drafted by the nations of Western Europe after the
end of World War II to protect essential human freedoms from government interference, became effective on September 3, 1953. Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 222 & n.1
[hereinafter European Convention]. Article One of the European Convention requires that each government signatory guarantee its citizens the rights and freedoms
defined in the European Convention. Id. art. 1, at 224. To comply, governments may
either incorporate the treaty directly into their domestic laws or acknowledge analogous rights under domestic law. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Note, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990

DuKE LJ. 1398, 1417.

Britain has neither incorporated the European Convention itself nor established
domestic law parallel to the rights secured by the European Convention. Id. at 1418;
see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 480-81 ("The obligations of [the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Iceland, and the Scandinavian countries] under the Convention remain essentially international treaty obligations. English courts are not bound by the provisions of the Convention .

. .

."). Nevertheless, English courts are free to consider the

content of the European Convention if English law on the subject under consideration is ambiguous. Id. at 481.
4 Wright, supra note 2, at 292. In 1981, the British began considering the creation
of a bill of rights. Id. In 1987, a Private Member's Bill was introduced in the British
Parliament to enact a bill of rights, but failed to secure the requisite votes to progress
beyond a second reading. Simon Lee, BicentennialBork, TercentennialSpycatcher: Do the
British Need a Bill of Rights?, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 777, 780-81 & n.24 (1988). In Britain, a
bill must receive three readings before it is eligible to become a law. 2 THE EUROPA
WORLD Y.B. 1993 2925, 2926 [hereinafter EUROPA].
Although there is no written constitution in Britain, a common law right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the press, exists. 28 LORD HAIsHAM
OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 1 834, at 553 (4th ed. 1979). Some
critics maintain, however, that this law is too restrictive. See, e.g., Censorship in the Arts,
140 NEW L.J. 1374, 1374-75 (1990) (observing that Lord Prosser, a Scottish High
Court Judge known for his independent thinking, called for the loosening or abolition of "'our repressive laws against freedom of expression,'" particularly in the area
of libel).
5 Libel, like slander, is a form of defamation. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 417 (6th
ed. 1990). Defamation is defined as "[a]n intentional false communication, either
published or publicly spoken, that injures another's reputation or good name." Id.
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forded under American law.6
In contrast to American law, 7 libel is a strict liability offense in
England.' As such, an English plaintiff need only prove that the
Libel is defamation expressed in "print, writing, pictures, or signs." Id. at 915. In its
broadest sense, libel refers to any publication that injures the reputation of another.
Id. Slander, on the other hand, is defamation expressed orally or by transitory gestures. Id. at 1388.
At common law, the chief distinction between libel and slander lay in the burden
of proof needed to sustain the action. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 785-86 (5th ed. 1984). Certain defamatory words, if
written, were deemed to be actionable without proving any actual damage. Id. If the
words were spoken, however, damage to the plaintiff had to be proven. Id. See infra
note 6 for a discussion on the development of libel law in Great Britain and infra note
7 for a discussion on the development of libel law in the United States.
6 Sean T. Prosser, Note, The English Libel Crisis: A Sullivan Appellate Review Standard is Needed, 13 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 337, 345 (1992). Britain's libel laws
are rooted in the Middle Ages, an era when the Church was the final arbiter of truth
and falsity. BARRETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1197. In the thirteenth century, the English seignorial courts heard matters of slander. Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA.
L. REv. 1349, 1350 (1975). As time progressed, the ecclesiastical courts obtained jurisdiction and treated slander as a spiritual transgression, punishable by penance. Id. It
was not until the late sixteenth century that the common law courts recognized a civil
slander action for damages. Id. By the seventeenth century, the law of political or
seditious libel developed through prosecutions before the Court of the Star Chamber.
Id.
The ideology of seditious libel proclaimed that all justice and law derived from
the King, whose acts were above reproach. BARRETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1199.
Accordingly, the printing or writing of any public criticism of the sovereign became a
crime carrying severe penalties, including indefinite imprisonment and large fines.
Id. The jurisdiction of the Court of the Star Chamber eventually extended to nonpolitical libel. Eaton, supra, at 1350. After the abolishment of that court in 1641, the
common law courts obtained jurisdiction over libel. Id. By the mid-seventeenth century, therefore, the common law courts had jurisdiction over both libel and slander.
Id.
7 The American law of defamation originally followed the English common law,
holding defendants to a strict liability standard if they intentionally published libelous
statements. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 804. In 1964, however, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the United States Constitution imposed special limits on
liability for libel of a public figure or official. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964). Specifically, the Court held that a public official cannot maintain
a libel action without proving that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of the
communication or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Id. See infra notes
87-95 and accompanying text (discussing Sullivan). Similarly, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment bars the imposition of liability without fault when the plaintiff is a private individual. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). See infra note 95 for a discussion of Gertz. Thus, irrespective of the status of a plaintiff in a libel action, the American common law's imposition
of strict liability has definitively been held unconstitutional. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 5, at 803-05.
8 28 LORD HAiLSHAM OF ST. MARYLoENE, supra note 4,

omitted).

1, at 3 (footnotes
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libelous words referred to him.9 Once a plaintiff has proven the
defamatory nature of the words, the law presumes those words to
be false."0 Nevertheless, for public policy reasons, defendants are
afforded some protection under this rigid standard.'" Specifically,
the law recognizes the defenses of "absolute" and "qualified" privi12
lege, justification, and fair comment.
9 28 id. 7 18, at 10. Prior to 1825, however, a plaintiff was required to prove the
element of "malice." Eaton, supra note 6, at 1353 n.15. Eventually, this requirement
was relaxed, and the pleading of malice became a formality. Id.; see Bromage v. Prosser, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1055 (KB. 1825) (declaring that although the plaintiff may
introduce evidence of malice to increase the damages awarded, it is not an essential
element of the plaintiff's case).
Even accepting a defendant's contention that statements referred to a fictional
character, British courts have nonetheless upheld a verdict of libel. Jones v. E. Hulton
& Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444, 445-46, 455, 458 (C.A.), affd, 1910 App. Cas. 20 (1909). In
Jones, a newspaper published an article containing statements that one Artemus Jones
was having an extramarital affair. Id. at 444-45. Both the writer of the article and the
newspaper publishers believed Mr. Jones to be a fictitious person. Id. at 445-46.
Moreover, both believed the name to be too unusual to be the name of an actual
person. Id. at 446. A British barrister named Thomas Artemus Jones sued the newspaper for libel, alleging that the article defamed him. Id. at 444-45. The court upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, reasoning that even if the newspaper did not
intend the defamatory statements to refer to the plaintiff, reasonable people who
knew the plaintiff would presume those statements referred to him. Id. at 455, 458.
10 28 LORD HALSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, supra note 4,
16, at 9 (footnote
omitted).
11 28 id. 7 3, at 4.
12 28 id. 7 3, 81, 131, at 4, 42, 69-70 (footnotes omitted). An "absolute" privilege
affords a defendant a complete defense to libel, regardless of whether the words were
published maliciously. 28 id. 3, at 4. An absolute privilege is applied to words spoken by judges, juries, counsel, witnesses, or parties to ajudicial action. 28 id. 98, at
48-49 (footnote omitted). The privilege extends to all statements, oral and written,
regardless of their relevance to the court proceedings. Id. (footnote omitted).
A "qualified" privilege, however, allows the defendant only limited protection. 28
id. 3, at 4. A qualified privilege affords protection to a person who acted in good
faith without any improper motive when making a false and defamatory statement. 28
id. 108, at 54. For example, privileged statements are those made in furtherance of
a "legal, social, or moral duty" to a person who has a corresponding duty or interest to
receive them. 28 id. 111, at 55-56 (footnotes omitted); see Stuart v. Bell, [1891] 2
Q.B. 341, 346 (C.A.) (reasoning that an occasion is privileged if it is for society's
common convenience and welfare). The plaintiff can negate the protection by establishing that the defamatory words were published with actual or express malice. 28
LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, supra note 4, 3, at 4.
The third recognized defense at common law to England's strict liability standard
for libel is the defense ofjustification, where one alleges that the words complained of
were factually true and true in substance. 28 id.
81, at 42 (footnote omitted).
Under English common law, every man is presumed to be of "good repute" until
proven otherwise. Id. Accordingly, the defendant has the burden of proving that the
defamatory words are either true or substantially true. Id. (footnote omitted).
The defense of fair comment, the fourth common law defense to libel, was first
recognized during the Victorian era as a defense distinct from privilege. 28 id. at 1
131, at 69-70 (footnote omitted). This defense is extended to any member of the
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Originally, the American judicial system was modelled after
the British common law and long-followed precedent established
in English cases. 1 3 Only recently have British courts turned to their
offspring across the ocean for similar guidance in the area of defamation.14 Even after considering relevant American cases, howpublic who remarks on matters of public interest. Id. (footnote omitted). Fair comment differs from justification because it applies only to statements that were expressions of opinion, not to defamatory statements of fact. Id. (footnote omitted).
13 Robert Stevens, Basic Concepts and Current Differences in English and American Law, Address Before the British Institute of the United States (Apr. 1983), in 6J.
LEGAL HisT. 336, 336-37 (1985). During the period of approximately 1880 to 1920,
America was particularly reliant on British precedent. Id. at 342. American courts are
now, however, far less likely to cite to English cases. Id. at 345.
14 Lester, The Overseas Trade, supra note 3, at 543. Although the two systems diverged drastically due to different social and political pressures, England's concept of
law has shifted towards America's concept of law in the last three decades or so. Stevens, supra note 13, at 336-37, 346. The federal judiciary has developed legal principles that have served as persuasive authority and have strongly influenced the
development of the following four areas of law in England and its dominions: the
fight to procedural justice and due process of law; the right of equal treatment without unfair discrimination; the right to privacy; and the right to freedom of expression.
Lester, The Overseas Trade, supra note 3, at 543; see also Stevens, supra note 13, at 346
(noting that constitutional and administrative law in the two countries are more
closely aligned than they were 50 years ago).
Although English courts seem less willing to accept some of the fundamental
fights mentioned above, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has upheld the
right to procedural due process and equal protection. See Ong Ah Chuan v. Public
Prosecutor, 1981 App. Cas. 648, 669, 670 (P.C. 1980) (appeal taken from Sing.) (construing the Constitution of Singapore to guarantee procedural due process and equal
protection, even though decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on its
Bill of Rights were deemed to be of little assistance). The Privy Council hears appeals
from the highest courts of a number of Commonwealth countries, including New
Zealand, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Malaysia, Singapore, The Gambia, Barbados,
Mauritius, Fiji, and the Bahamas. JACKSON'S MACHINERY OF JUSTICE 98 (J.R. Spencer
ed., 8th ed. 1989) (hereinafterjACKSON'S]. The Privy Council is comprised of Britain's
highest ranking judges, the Lords of the Appeal in the Ordinary, and high-ranking
judges from the Commonwealth nations. Id. at 93, 98.
OngAh Chuan involved mandatory death sentences imposed on two drug traffickers. OngAh Chuan, 1981 App. Cas. at 663. The two defendants were each caught with
an amount of heroin that raised the rebuttable presumption that the possession was
for the purpose of distribution. Id. at 663, 664. Section 29 of Singapore's Misuse of
Drug Act imposed a mandatory death sentence upon conviction for possession of any
amount over the minimum quantities stated in § 15 of the same Act. Id. at 664. Both
defendants argued that the statutory presumption of § 15 was unconstitutional and
conflicted with their "presumption of innocence." Id. at 669. The Privy Council dismissed the appeal and upheld the defendants' convictions and sentences. Id. at 674.
The Privy Council based its decision on the fact that the presumption contained in
§ 15 of the Act was rebuttable and, therefore, did not run contrary to Singapore's
constitutional requirement of equal protection. Id. at 670, 671-72.
The United Kingdom's acceptance and promotion of American concepts of nondiscrimination and equal protection under the law for all citizens has occurred
through Parliamentary Acts. Lester, The Overseas Trade, supranote 3, at 550; cf. D.G.T.
Williams, Aspects of Equal Protection in the United Kingdom, 59 TUL. L. REv. 959, 965

1554

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1549

ever, English courts have continued to impose restrictions on
expression and the press in all but a few cases.' 5 Consequently, the
only recourse available to a litigant challenging the restrictive view
of the British courts in the area of free speech was to appeal the
case to the European Commission of Human Rights (European
Commission)6 Moreover, although the European Court of
Human Rights (European Court), which has adopted the American approach to libel, has often overruled the British courts, the
British judiciary continues to adhere to a narrow view of fundamental rights. 7
(1985) (remarking that the common law restricts British courts from forging new
ground in matters of discrimination and equal protection). This adoption has been
particularly true in the areas of racial and sexual discrimination and equal pay. Lester, The Overseas Trade, supra note 3, at 550.
15 Lester, The Overseas Trade, supranote 3, at 552; see Home Office v. Harman, 1983
App. Cas. 280, 300, 301, 307, 309, 318 (1982) (Scarman & Simon, L.JJ., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's decision to hold a solicitor in contempt of court for disclosing documents obtained in discovery to the press, even though the documents had
been read in open court, and noting that "there will certainly be a divergence between the common law as understood in the United States and as understood in this
country").
16 Andrews, supra note 2, at 480-81. One commentator has noted that the process
of appeal to the European Commission of Human Rights (European Commission)
denies British citizens swift and effective redress. Lester, Fundamental Rights, supra
note 3, at 71. The European Convention established a two-tiered system of review
through which individuals could pursue complaints regarding violations of individual
rights, including free speech, by member states. European Convention, supra note 3,
arts. 10, 19, at 230, 234. Under this system, an individual's first recourse is to petition
the European Commission. Id. arts. 26, 27(3), at 238. This appeal, however, may only
be done after all domestic remedies are exhausted. Id. art. 26, at 238. If, after reviewing the complaint, the European Commission is unable to reach a "friendly settlement," it may refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights (European
Court), the second level of review. Id. arts. 47, 48, at 246. While nations subscribing
to the European Convention may appeal directly to the European Court, individuals
have no such right. Id. arts. 44, 48, at 246. For a discussion of the origin of and
requirements to belong to the European Convention, see supra note 3.
British domestic courts have no direct obligation to consider the dictates of the
European Convention. Krotoszynski, supranote 3, at 1418. English courts are, nonetheless, free to consider the content of the European Convention if English law on
the subject at hand is ambiguous. Andrews, supra note 2, at 481; see also AttorneyGeneral v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109, 283 (1988)
(observing that it is the court's duty to interpret common law in accordance with the
European Convention).
17 See Ferdinand Mount, Sorting out John Bul, THE TiMEs (London), Apr. 14, 1992,
at Al0 (noting that British judges are often overruled by the provisions of the European Convention, of which the judges take only glancing account).
In Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., for example, Britain's highest court,
the House of Lords, restrained a newspaper, under threat of contempt of court, from
publishing a series of articles on the plight of children born with birth defects who
were parties to pending, though long dormant, litigation. Attorney-General v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., 1974 App. Cas. 273, 277-79, 301 (1973). The Sunday Times filed a
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In a recent case, however, Derbyshire County Council v. Times
Newspapers Ltd.,"8 the House of Lords' 9 adopted a more expansive
view of free expression, akin to the American approach to free
speech and free press."0 Specifically, the House of Lords addressed
for the first time whether a governmental body has a governing
complaint with the European Commission, charging that the decision of the House of
Lords had intruded on their right to free expression guaranteed under a provision of
the European Convention. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 27 (1978). The case eventually reached the full European Court, which decided
that the House of Lords had indeed violated the newspaper's rights under the European Convention. Id. at 45.
18 1993 App. Cas. 534.
19 The House of Lords is the Upper Branch of the British legislature, comprised of
hereditary Peers of the Realm, Life Peers and Peeresses appointed by the Sovereign
for outstanding public service, and high-ranking clergy. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 739,
944 (6th ed. 1990);JACKSON'S, supra note 14, at 93. The House of Lords, which is also

the court of final appeal in the United Kingdom, does not sit en bloc to hear cases.
SIR JACK I. H. JACOB, THE FABRIC OF ENGLISH CIVIL JUSTICE 241, 242 (1987). Rather,
an inner group, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, commonly known as the "law lords,"
decide most civil appeals and have jurisdiction over impeachment. Id.; see BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 739 (6th ed. 1990) (outlining the extent of the House of Lords jurisdiction). Law lords are not part of the hereditary peerage, but rather are appointed
members of the House of Lords who have occupied high judicial office or distinguished themselves in the legal profession. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1412 n.75;
see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 886 (6th ed. 1990) (describing the background necessary
to be considered for appointment as a law lord).
Parliament consists of the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and the British Sovereign. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1116 (6th ed. 1990). The House of Commons is composed of county, city, and borough representatives. Id. at 739. The acts
of Parliament are "the supreme law of the land" in Britain, and even the judiciary is
barred from weighing the constitutionality of Parliament's acts. Wright, supra note 2,
at 292; see also Lester, The Overseas Trade, supra note 3, at 549 (recognizing that the
British Parliament wields unqualified and unrestricted power between elections).
English courts have traditionally subordinated themselves to the legislature's will.
Alan Watson, A House of Lords'Judgment,and Other Tales of the Absurd, 33 AM. J. COMP.
L. 673, 704 (1985). Moreover, English courts are loathe to act when there is no parliamentary direction. See id. (submitting that the law lords interpret absence of legislation as a deliberate intention on the part of Parliament not to act). As a result, in
the absence of legislation, the courts often blindly adhere to ancient, perchance unjust, precedent rather than forge into new territory with an open mind. See id.
In President of India v. La Pintada Compafilh Navagaci6n S.A., for example, the
House of Lords did not allow a contracting party to claim as damages interest for nonpayment because payment, though delayed, was made before the proceedings began.
President of India v. La Pintada Compafila Navagaci6n S.A., [1985] 1 App. Cas. 104,
114, 118 (1984). One member of the House of Lords acknowledged that its decision
was unjust, and stated that "the present state of the law.., places the small creditor at
a grave disadvantage vis-A-vis his substantial and influential debtor." Id. at 112. Nevertheless, the House of Lords declined to usurp the power of Parliament, which had
declined to remedy the unfairness of the common law disallowance of such interest.
Id. at 130.
20 Anthony Lewis, Lawyers, Libel and Liberty, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 24, 1993, at
A16 (noting that the decision of the House of Lords in Derbyshire signalled an important movement in the Lords' philosophy towards the American view of free speech,
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reputation that it can protect by instituting an action in libel. 21 Applying principles developed under American First Amendment jurisprudence, 22 the Lords held that a local government could not
maintain a libel action against a publication that had printed negative articles concerning the local authority's governmental and administrative functions.2 3
In September 1989, three articles regarding stock or share
deals of the superannuation fund 24 of the Derbyshire County
Council 25 appeared in The Sunday Times. 26 Specifically, the House
considered two articles from the September 17, 1989 issue entitled
Revealed: Socialist Tycoon's Deals With a Labour Chief and BizarreDeals
of a Council Leader and the Media Tycoon.27 The court also examined
a third article headlined Council Share Deals Under Scrutiny.28 The
articles referred to David Bookbinder, a powerful member of the
Council, and Owen Oyston, the so-called "media tycoon." 29 The
"bridging a gap that has long existed between our two cultures"); Derbyshire,1993 App.
Cas. at 547-48 (referring to American case law as support for its decision).
21 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 541-42.
22 Specifically, the House of Lords relied on New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86 (Ill. 1923). Id. at 547-48.
For a discussion of Sullivan, see infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Tribune, see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
23 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 541-42, 550. In so holding, the House of Lords
found it unnecessary to rely on the European Convention for guidance. Id. at 551.
24 To superannuate is to retire, especially with a pension, due to old age or infirmity. WEBSTER'S THImD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2293 (Philip Babcock ed.,

1993). Therefore, a superannuation fund is a retirement or pension fund. See id.
25 Derbyshire is a county in central England with a population of approximately
940,000. EUROPA, supra note 4, at 2915. County Councils are the preeminent bureau
of local government in the United Kingdom. DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION To LAW 300 (1980). Their responsibilities cover such areas as strategic planning, education, waste disposal, police enforcement, fire protection, libraries, and
social services. CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFO., BlrrAIN 1993 AN OrFFCIAL HANDBOOK 55
(1993).
26 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1992] 1 Q.B. 770, 802
(C.A.) (Balcombe, L.J.), affd, 1993 App. Cas. 534. The Sunday Times, owned by News
International PLC, is one of the most influential newspapers in Britain. EUROPA,
supra note 4, at 2933, 2934.
27 Peter Hounam & Rosemary Collins, Revealed: Socialist Tycoon's Deals with a Labour Chief THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 1989, at Al [hereinafter Hounam &
Collins, Revealed]; Peter Hounam & Rosemary Collins, Bizarre Deals of a Council Leader
and the Media Tycoon, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 1989, at Al7 [hereinafter

Hounam & Collins, Bizarre].
28 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 806 (C.A.) (Balcombe, L.J.). This article actually appeared in the newspaper under another article entitled "Investigation Into Share
Dealings of Miss World Group." Investigation Into Share Dealings of Miss World Group,
THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 1989, at A23 [hereinafter Investigation].
29 Hounam & Collins, Bizarre, supra note 27, at A17. Owen Oyston, a flamboyant,
self-made millionaire with socialist leanings, operated one of the biggest commercial
radio empires in Britain. Id. David Bookbinder, a former market trader, had been a
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articles questioned the propriety of the Council's investment of
Derbyshire's superannuation fund moneys in three deals with Oyston or companies controlled by him."0
Following publication of the articles, the Derbyshire County
Council, Bookbinder, and Oyston brought actions in damages for
Labour Council leader for Derbyshire for twelve years and was chairman of Derbyshire's pension fund. Id.
30 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1992] 1 Q.B. 770, 776
(1990), rev'd, [1992] 1 Q.B. 770 (C.A.), affd 1993 App. Cas. 534. The articles, written
by The Sunday Times Insight team, were partially reproduced in the trial court's opinion penned by Justice Moreland. Id. The articles provided in pertinent part:
The funds's external investment advisers, Geoffrey Morley and Partners,
have confirmed that although they were told of the scheme, they were
not asked to give advice, contrary to a written assurance to a councillor
by Reg Beard, the council treasurer, that they had been consulted.
The deals could be ultra vires (that is, outside the council's legal
powers) and a breach of the Local Government Superannuation Regulations 1986, under which councils are obliged to take proper advice
and act 'with reasonable care, skill and caution'.
The outcome of this extraordinary deal was that Derbyshire's
pension fund had made Oyston richer on paper by as much as Elm.
Because the transaction was carried out in this way, the loser was
Derbyshire's pension fund. As with the Telemags transaction, the only
advice taken by Derbyshire before making the £2m investment was from
its own financial officers.
Hounam & Collins, Bizarre, supra note 27, at A17.
The third article appearing on September 24, 1989 contained similar allegations:
Questionable share deals involving the Miss World group and the
pension funds of a county council are being investigated by the Stock
Exchange and the City's Takeover Panel after their disclosure by The
Sunday Times Insight team.
The inquiries will focus on a suspicious series of share transactions
by Derbyshire [C] ounty [C] ouncil prior to the bitterly contested takeover
by the Miss World group of Piccadilly Radio in Manchester earlier this
year.
Such inquiries would determine whether a false market in Miss
World shares was created before and during a takeover. In a shares-forshares takeover, the likely result would be to strengthen the hand of the
bidder at the expense of its 'victim'.
Insight's new share revelations come after evidence of improper
behaviour and legally doubtful share transactions between Oyston and
Derbyshire. Last week Insight revealed that some of Derbyshire's earlier
associations with Oyston, including a plan to build a holiday resort behind the Iron Curtain, could be ultra vires, or outside the council's legal
scope.
After a series of share transactions following a failed investment of
£305,000 in the News on Sunday newspaper, Oyston benefitted on paper by as much as Elm from investments by Derbyshire's pension fund.
Investigation, supra note 28, at A23.
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libel against The Sunday Times, its editor, and the two authors of the
articles." The defendants applied to dismiss the County Council's
claim on the grounds that the Council could not maintain a libel
action for statements made with respect to the Council's governmental and administrative undertakings.3 2
The trial court never reached the issue of whether the articles
were libelous, but instead confined itself to two preliminary points
of law. 3 3 First, the trial court analyzed whether the Council could
maintain a libel action for words that reflected upon the Council's
governmental and administrative functions, including its statutorily
3 4 for the investment and
defined responsibility
supervision of the
superannuation fund, even in the absence of pleading financial
loss. 5 Next, the court examined the issue of whether the claim was
sufficient to maintain a cause of action, even if the financial loss
pleading requirement was not met. 36 The trial court unequivocally
found not only that a local authority was entitled to sue for libel,3
but also that the Council had adequately stated a cause of action.
31 Derbyshire,[1992] 1 Q.B. at 775; Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 802 (C.A.) (Balcombe,
L.J.). The Council also sought to enjoin the defendants from publishing any further
libelous articles. Derbyshire,[1992] 1 Q.B. at 775. Oyston ultimately settled his case in
1991 after receiving an apology and the payment of damages and costs. Derbyshire,
[1992] 1 Q.B. at 802 (Balcombe, L.J.).
On October 13, 1991, The Sunday Times printed an apology to Oyston, admitting
that the allegations contained in the 1989 articles were unfounded. Sunday Times
Apology to Owen Oysten, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 13, 1991, at A3. The defendants agreed to pay Oysten a "substantial sum" of money as damages and to indemnify him for all legal costs associated with his suit. Id.
32 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 776, 789-90.
33 Id. at 776.
34 The Superannuation Act, 1972 provides that County Councils are the administering authority of their superannuation funds. The Superannuation Act, 1972, ch.
11, § 8(5) (Eng.). The purposes of the Superannuation Act were to "amend the law
relating to pensions and other similar benefits payable to or in respect of persons in
certain employment" and to "provide for distribution without proof of certain sums
due to or in respect of certain deceased persons . . . and with purposes connected
with the matters aforesaid." Id. at preliminary note.
The Local Government Superannuation Regulations, (S.I. 1986 No. 24), decree
the guidelines for the investment and control of superannuation fund money. Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 776 (citation omitted). One of the limitations, for example,
decrees that no more than 10% of the fund may be invested in unlisted securities. Id.
35 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 778. The trial court examined The Sunday Times's
contention that Derbyshire's failure to allege monetary loss barred suit under the
Local Government Act of 1972. Id. at 788.
36 Id. at 776.
37 Id. at 788. The justice grounded his opinion on the long-standing recognition
that a corporation may sue for libel, and that a local authority is in essence a municipal corporation. Id. at 779, 788. The justice emphasized that case law on the issue
was unambiguous. Id. at 778, 779 (citation omitted).
38 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 790. The defendants unsuccessfully argued that the
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In so holding, the justice rejected the Times's attempt to analogize
the case at bar to United States case law decided under the First
39
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Local Government Act of 1972 barred the council's suit. Id. at 788, 790. Section 222
of the Act, entided "Power of local authorities to prosecute or defend legal proceedings," reads, in pertinent part:
(1) Where a local authority consider it expedient for the promotion or
protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area(a) they may prosecute or defend or appear in any legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in
their own name ....
Local Government Act 1972, § 222 (Eng.).
The defendants contended that an action that does not allege an actual or possible monetary loss cannot conceivably be one for the "inhabitants of the area." Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 788. Justice Moreland, however, found a cause of action for libel
existed notwithstanding that the parties incurred no actual financial losses. Id. at 788,
790.
39 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 784-85 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86 (Ill. 1923)). The relevant
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as
follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thejustice opined: "I must decide this case according
to the English law of tort and not American constitutional law, however admirable
those sentiments may be." Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 785.
In City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., the city of Chicago brought suit against a newspaper company for publishing articles that alleged the city was on the brink of financial
ruin. Tribune, 139 N.E. at 86. See infra note 107 for a rendition of the published
libelous statements. After examining the history of seditious libel in England and its
subsequent short-lived application in the United States, the Illinois Supreme Court
declared that the City could not maintain a cause of action. Tribune, 139 N.E. at 8790. The court noted that unlike the government of England, where the Sovereign was
presumed to be the fountainhead of all authority, the government of the United
States was rooted in its citizens. Id. at 88, 90.
ChiefJustice Thompson, writing for a unanimous court, opined that every citizen
has the right to criticize the government free from fear of civil or criminal prosecution. Id. at 90. The chiefjustice noted that this liberty was founded on the theory that
it was beneficial to the public interest that citizens should be allowed to speak their
minds freely. Id.
New York Times v. Sullivan involved a case where The New York Times was sued in
libel for publishing an editorial advertisement which allegedly defamed a commissioner of the city of Montgomery, Alabama. Id. at 256. The advertisement levied
several false charges of terrorism against the Montgomery police department, which
Sullivan supervised. Id. at 256-59. The United States Supreme Court, reversing the
decision of the Alabama Supreme Court, ruled that the First Amendment precludes a
public official, such as Sullivan, from recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods
associated with his official capacity unless the official proves that the statements were
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The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, reversed.4 ° The Court of
Appeal 41 unanimously agreed that notwithstanding the general
principle that a corporation was entitled to sue in libel to protect
its corporate reputation,4 2 a local government was not entitled at
common law to sue for libel to protect its governing reputation.43
The Lords Justices reasoned that allowing a public authority to sustain a libel action would stifle legitimate public criticism of its activities, 44 and would therefore interfere with the right of freedom of
expression enshrined in Article Ten of the European Convention. 41 In rejecting the Council's claim, the court noted that a lomade with "actual malice." Id. at 279-80, 292. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
defined actual malice as a statement made with "knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. For a discussion of Sullivan, see infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
40 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1992] 1 Q.B. 770, 817
(C.A.), affd, 1993 App. Cas. 534.
41 Each of the three lords justices hearing the appeal, LordJustice Balcombe, Lord
Justice Ralph Gibson, and Lord Justice Butler-Sloss, authored a separate opinion. Id.
at 801, 818, 827.
In all, 28 Lords Justices of Appeal are appointed to the Court of Appeal, three of
whom are typically assigned to each case. JACKSON'S, supra note 14, at 90, 363. The
lords justices are appointed from all divisions of the High Court (i.e., the King's (or
Queen's) Bench Division, the Chancery Division, and the Family Division) and thus
contribute their own unique wisdom and experience to the case at hand, which allows
for a well-rounded judgment. SIRJACOB, supra note 19, at 218-19; THE BLUEBOOK-A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 253 (15th ed. 1991). Due to their varied backgrounds,
it is not uncommon for the Lords Justices hearing an appeal to deliver their own
separate opinions. SIR JACOB, supra note 19, at 219. For a comprehensive introduction to the British legal system, see generally P.F. SMITH & S.H. BAILEY, THE MODERN
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (1984).
42 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 809-10 (Balcombe, L.J.); see e.g., National Union of
General & Municipal Workers v. Gillian, [1946] 1 K.B. 81, 87 (C.A. 1945) (Scott, L.J.)
(stating that an action in libel was no exception to the general rule that a trade union
could maintain an action in tort); South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News
Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 133, 139, 140 (C.A. 1893) (holding that a coal mining company could maintain an action for libel calculated to injure business reputation without proof of special damage).
43 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 817 (Balcombe, L.J.). The appellate court concluded
that no cause of action existed despite the fact that the authority was technically a
"corporate" public authority. Id. at 809-10, 817 (Balcombe, L.J.).
44 Id. at 825 (Ralph Gibson, L.J.).
45 Id. at 832 (Butler-Sloss, L.J.). Article Ten of the European Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers ....

(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
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cal government's reputation could be adequately safeguarded by
bringing an action for malicious falsehood or a prosecution for
criminal libel.4 6
Given leave by the court of appeal,4 7 the Council subsequently
appealed to the House of Lords.4" The House of Lords recognized
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 3, art. 10, at 230.
Both Lord Justice Balcombe, writing the Court of Appeal's leading judgment,
and Lord Justice Butler-Sloss noted that the court was not bound to follow the dictates
of the European Convention when English law was clear and unambiguous. Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 812, 830 (Balcombe & Butler-Sloss, L.JJ.). Accordingly, Lord
Justice Butler-Sloss pronounced, the law of libel with respect to individuals did not
require that the court consider the European Convention. Id. at 830 (Butler-Sloss,
LJ.). Lord Justice Butler-Sloss expiated, however, that whenever the law was not settied, it was both the right and the responsibility of the English court to consider the
inferences from Article 10. Id. With Article 10 in mind, the Court of Appeal reasoned that a right to sue for libel was unnecessary in a democratic society for the
protection of a public authority's status. See id. at 816, 817 (Balcombe, L.J.).
46 Derbyshire, [1992] 1 Q.B. at 816 (Balcombe, L.J.). Ultimately, the court reasoned,
the persons allegedly defamed would inevitably be the government officers and ministers because a governmental body can act only through its agents. Id. Consequently,
the court observed, the right to sue for libel was available to the individual officers of
an authority, a remedy already pursued by Bookbinder in the instant case. Id. The
court subtly insinuated that in such future cases the public authority should subsidize
the individual's actions. Id.
The Court of Appeal explicated that the distinction between the tort of defamation and the tort of malicious falsehood lay in which party has the burden of proof.
Id. at 816-17 (Balcombe, L.J.). The court observed that the burden of proof in the
former fell on the defendant, i.e., the defendant must prove that the defamatory statements were true, while the burden in the latter fell on the plaintiff, i.e., the plaintiff
must prove that the malicious statements were false. Id. at 817 (Balcombe, L.J.).
Moreover, Lord Justice Balcombe stressed, in an action for malicious falsehood the
plaintiff must prove actual malice, in contrast to the proof necessary to sustain successfully an action for defamation. Id. Lord Justice Balcombe also noted that no
presumption of damage in a claim of malicious falsehood existed as it did in a claim
of libel. Id. (citation omitted).
47 Prior to 1934, a litigant who lost a case in the Court of Appeal had an unrestricted right to appeal to the House of Lords. JAcKsoN's, supra note 14, at 94. This
procedure was altered by the Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act 1934, which
compels the party to obtain leave either directly from the Court of Appeal or from the
House of Lords itself. Id. This process ensures that the right of appeal will not be
misused. Id. In very rare instances, a party in a civil suit may appeal directly from the
High Court to the House of Lords, thereby bypassing the Court of Appeal. Id. This
procedure, known as "leapfrogging," however, is employed only in comparatively few
cases. Id. Moreover, leapfrogging is strictly limited to situations where a legal issue of
general public importance is involved in the decision or where a lower court judge,
bound by precedent, determines that there are grounds for reconsideration of the
issue. Id.
48 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1993 App. Cas. 534, 536.
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that the issue in the case had evolved beyond the initial inquiry of
whether a local authority was entitled to maintain an action in libel
for statements criticizing its governmental and administrative
roles.4 9 Consequently, the Lords expanded their analysis to determine whether a local governmental entity could sue in libel at all.5"
Basing its decision on English common law and American First
Amendment jurisprudence, the House of Lords held that a local
authority had no right to maintain a civil action for libel in any
circumstance. 5 ' Lord Keith of Kinkel, writing the opinion for the
House of Lords, found it unnecessary to rely upon the dictates of
the European Convention, reasoning that there was no integral difference between English libel law and Article Ten of the European
Convention.5 2
Under the common law of England, it is well established that a
corporation may maintain an action in libel.5 3 For over a century,
British courts have construed this right to mean that a corporation
may maintain a libel action not only for defamatory words that affect its property, but also for libelous statements that affect its personal reputation.5 4 This interpretation was illustrated in South
Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News Association,5 5 where a mining
company sued a newspaper that had published an article alleging
that housing provided by the company for its colliers was unfit for
habitation and highly unsanitary."b The court of appeal held that
the company was entitled to maintain a libel suit without proof of
particular damages.5 7 The South Hetton court maintained that regardless of who the plaintiff was, the law of libel was the same.5"
Id. at 542.
Id.
51 Id. at 54748, 550.
52 Id. at 551. Unlike the Court of Appeal's analysis, which relied upon the dictates
of the European Convention, the House of Lords analyzed the case differently. Id. at
550, 551.
53 See, e.g., Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council v. Campion, [1972] 2 Q.B. 169, 17677 (quoting Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, [1859] 4 H. & N. 87, 90
(Ex. Ch.)). See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bognor
Regis.
54 South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 138-39
(C.A. 1893).
55 [1894] 1 Q.B. 133 (C.A. 1893).
56 Id. at 133.
57 Id. at 139.
58 Id. at 138. Specifically, the court asserted:
[T] he law of libel is one and the same as to all plaintiffs; and.., whether
the statement complained of is, or is not, a libel, depends on the same
question-viz., whether the jury are of the opinion that what has been
published with regard to the plaintiff would tend in the minds of people
49
50
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However, the application of libel law to a plaintiff, the court asserted, may be different.5 9 The court commented that some statements, whether made with regard to a firm or individual, would be
libelous.60 In these situations, the court maintained, the determination of damages only requires consideration of the parties' conduct and the circumstances of the case. 61
A corporation's right to sue in libel was further extended to
offer protection to a trade union in National Union of General and
Municipal Workers v. Gillian.62 In Gillian, the court affirmed that a
trade union could proceed with an action in libel against another
union and a printing firm for statements contained in a circular
and in a journal called The Chemical Worker.63 In allowing such an
action, the court of appeal interpreted certain provisions of the
Trade Union Act of 1871 as evidence of the British Parliament's
of ordinary sense to bring the plaintiff into contempt, hatred, or ridicule, or to injure his character. The question is really the same by
whomsoever the action is brought-whether by a person, a firm, or a
company.
Id.
59 Id. For example, the court postulated that a statement declaring that a person
had manners "contrary to all sense of decency or comity" would clearly be libelous
against an individual. Id. A similar statement made about a firm or company, the
court opined, could not possibly have the same effect. Id. Thus, the court concluded
that although libel law is the same with regard to libel on a firm and libel on a person,
the conditions under which a particular statement may be libelous will vary. Id.
60 Id. Specifically, such a situation would occur, the court exemplified, where the
statement concerned one's conduct of business. Id. Such statements, the court remarked, might lead ordinary people to believe that a person or firm conducts their
business inefficiently. Id. at 138-39.
61 Id. at 139. South Hetton Coal Co. has been cited with approval in the United
States. See Finnish Temperance Soc'y Sovittaja v. Publishing Co., 130 N.E. 845, 847
(Mass. 1921); see also New York Soc'y for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 183 N.E. 284, 285 (N.Y. 1932) (following expressly the decision of the
Finnish Temperance Society court).
Finnish Temperance Society Sovittaja v. PublishingCo. arose after a Finnish language
newspaper published two rambling letters from an anonymous correspondent concerning the plaintiff, a Massachusetts society that promoted temperance and morality
and owned and operated a social meeting place for its members. Finnish Temperance
Soc'y, 130 N.E. at 845. The first letter called the society a "'national temperance sour
milk broth cake bakery'" and alleged, among other things, that it operated a "'gambling and gaming den'" and an "'old holy secret bar room of the Synod.'" Id. at 84546. The second letter continued in a similar fashion and charged that the plaintiff
was a "'pious nest of hypocrites, harmonizers and brawlers.'" Id. at 846. Quoting
from the judgment of Lord Esher, M.R., in South Hetton Coal Co., the Finnish Temperance Society court furthered that because a reputation is as valuable to a corporation as
it is to an individual, a corporation may be damaged by libel in the same manner that
an individual is harmed. Id. at 847 (quoting South Hetton Coal Co.v. North-Eastern
News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 138, 139, 140 (C.A. 1893)).
62 (1946] 1 K.B. 81, 87 (C.A. 1945) (Scott, L.J.).
63 Id. at 81, 86-87 (Scott, L.J.).
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intention to endow a trade union with a legal personality similar to
that of a corporation.6 4 Moreover, the Gillian court regarded as
strongly persuasive the fact that the House of Lords had recognized, at least in principal, that a trade union is an entity distinct
from the individuals who compose it.65
While the right of a corporate entity to bring an action for
libel is clear, only two reported cases involving an English local governmental authority suing for libel existed prior to Derbyshire,
neither of which progressed beyond the divisional court.6 6 In the
first case, Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Manchester v. Williams"7
(Manchester Corp.), the defendant wrote a letter to the editor of a
newspaper charging the plaintiffs, the municipal corporation of
the City of Manchester, with corruption.6' The newspaper subsequently published the letter.6 9
In a brief decision, the court announced that a municipality
may sue only for libel affecting property, and not for libel affecting
personal reputation."y Relying on Metropolitan Saloon Co. v. Hawkins,7 ' the Manchester Corp. court reasoned that only the individuals
64 Id. at 84-86 (Scott, L.J.). Specifically, the lord claimed, the Trade Union Act of
1871 allowed a trade union to assume many of the attributes of ajudicial personality.
Id. at 85 (Scott, L.J.). The only powers a trade union did not have, Lord Justice Scott
noted, were those solely attributable to a natural person or those expressly excepted
by statute. Id. at 86 (Scott, LJ.). Lord Justice Scott thus concluded that "if the personajuridica is liable to be sued for infringing the rights of others, it must equally be
able to sue to vindicate its own right." Id.
65 Id. at 87-88 (Uthwatt, J.) (citing Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, 1901 App. Cas. 426, 431 (Farwell,J.)). Justice Uthwatt even described a trade
union as a "near-corporation." Id. at 88. In Taff, the House of Lords found that when
Parliament created trade unions, it created a legal entity that could own property,
possess servants, and cause injuries to others. Taff 1901 App. Cas. at 436 (Earl of
Halsbury, L.C.). Accordingly, Lord Halsbury, the Lord Chancellor, implied that the
Legislature gave the courts power to hold trade unions accountable for infringing
upon the rights of others. Id. The Gillian court contended that the Taff holding was
tantamount to the House of Lords's validation of a union's privilege to vindicate its
own rights. Gillian, [1946] 1 KB. at 86-87 (Scott, L.J.). But see infra note 85 (observing
that the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 rescinded a trade union's
right to pursue an action in libel).
66 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1993 App. Cas. 534, 543,
545.
67 [1891] 1 Q.B. 94 (1890) (Manchester Corp.).
68 Id. at 94. The published letter alleged that "'in the case of two, if not three,
departments of our Manchester city council, bribery and corruption have existed, and
done their nefarious work.'" Id. at 95. The defendant asserted that the allegedly
libelous statements were directed not at the Manchester government, but rather at
the individual bureaucrats. Id.

69 Id. at 94.

Id. at 96.
[1859] 4 H. & N. 87. In Metropolitan Saloon, a joint-stock company whose shares
had depreciated, initiated an action in libel. Manchester Corp, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 95.
70
71
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comprising a municipal corporation, rather than the municipality
itself, could be guilty of corruption. 72 Accordingly, the court implied that a municipality could not maintain an action for libel because such an entity had no personal reputation that could be
harmed by a libelous publication.73
Conversely, in Bognor Regis Urban District Council v. Campion,'
the second of the two previously recorded British cases in which a
local authority brought an action for libel, the court determined
that a local government corporation could protect its "governing"
reputation through a defamation action against a pamphleteer.7 5
The Bognor Regis controversy began when a resident of Felpham, an
area in the eastern part of the Bognor Regis urban district, distributed a leaflet that contained a vitriolic, disjointed attack on the
members of the local council at a meeting of the Felpham Ratepayers' Association. 76 The Urban District Council sued for damages,
Although the action was maintainable, the Metropolitan Saloon court concluded that a
corporation "could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder, or incest, or adultery, because it could not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue in respect of a
charge of corruption, for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, although the
individuals composing it may." Id. at 96.
The Manchester Corp. holding was severely criticized in many quarters. See Bognor
Regis Urban Dist. Council v. Campion, [1972] 2 Q.B. 169, 177-78 (quotation omitted).
Specifically, the Bognor Regis court chided:
It is obvious that 'reputation,' in the sense in which it alone concerns
the topic of defamation, has relation to the particular person enjoying
it. But it must not be forgotten that 'person' for this purpose includes
an artificial person: that is to say, it includes both 'a body of persons,'
and a firm, . . That a commercial 'body of persons' has a 'trading
character,' and can sue in respect of a publication tending to injure that
trading character, is now clearly established: ... But it is submitted that
a 'body of persons' has a collective character independently of the question whether it is a mercantile body or not, which the law is bound to
protect; in other words that any such body can sue in respect of an imputation of any conduct whatsoeverof which its agents, and therefore itself
by its agents, can be guilty. At present the authorities have not gone so
far as this. Indeed, there is one dictum and one decision (not, however,
of the Court of Appeal) which are against such a comprehensive proposition. I venture to think that both the dictum and the decision are
wrong, and that, as soon as they come under review by the Court of
Appeal, will be declared to be so.
Id. (quotation omitted). See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Bognor Regis.
72 Manchester Corp., [1891] 1 Q.B. at 95-96 (quotation omitted).
73 Id. at 96.
74 [1972] 2 Q.B. 169.
75 Id. at 175.
76 Id. at 170-72. The pamphlet, among other things, described Bognor's Council
as a "'toytown Hitlerism local government,'" accused certain councilors of "'guttersnipe' attacks" on taxpayers, and levied charges of political graft. Id. at 170-71. Perhaps mindful of a forthcoming suit, the leaflet closed with the following statement:
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whereupon Eric William Campion, the defendant, claimed that the
majority of the leaflet referred only to the plaintiffs as specific individuals rather than as a corporate body."
The Bognor Regis court contended that the right of a governmental body to sue in libel derived naturally from the long-standing principle that a business corporation, whether trading or nontrading, could sue to protect its corporate reputation. 7 Mr. Justice
Browne, writing for the court, analogized a trading corporation's
reputation, which such an entity is permitted to defend, to a local
government corporation's "governing" reputation, which such an
authority is similarly privileged to protect. 79 The court recognized,
however, that a corporation was not entitled to maintain a libel
action for statements reflecting solely upon its individual officers or
members.8 0 Relying on a passage from a United States case that
supported this proposition,8 1 the court accepted that a corporation
"'I believe that all statements made in this leaflet are acceptable as "fair comment" or
are justifiable in the public interest. I am prepared to withdraw any statement that is
untrue or not justified.'" Id. at 172.
77 Id. Accordingly, the defendant, Eric William Campion, pled the defenses of
privilege, justification, and fair comment. Id. See supra note 12 for definitions of
these defenses.
78 Bognor Regis, [1972] 2 Q.B. at 175; see also Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd., 1964
App. Cas. 234, 262 (1963) ("A company cannot be injured in its feelings, it can only
be injured in its pocket. Its reputation can be injured by a libel but that injury must
sound in money."); National Union of Gen. & Mun. Workers v. Gillian, [1946] 1 K.B.
81, 87 (C.A. 1945) (noting that an action in libel was no exception to the general rule
that a trade union could maintain an action in tort); South Hetton Coal Co. v. NorthEastern News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 133, 139, 140 (C.A. 1893) (holding that a libel
action was maintainable by a coal mining company with respect to libel calculated to
injure business reputation). The right of private corporations to sue for libel based
upon their civil and private right to a corporate reputation, without proving actual
financial loss, descended from the same right guaranteed to individual human beings.
Respondent's Brief at 4, Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1993
App. Cas. 534 (No. 5957).
79 Bognor Regis, [19721 2 Q.B. at 175.
80 Id. (quotation omitted).
81 Warner Instrument Co. v. Ingersoll, 157 F. 311, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). In Warner
Instrument, the plaintiff corporation alleged that the defendant's publication of the
plaintiff's advertisement in connection with a separate printed article defamed the
plaintiff corporation. Id. at 311-12. In overruling the demurrer, the court recognized
the well-settled rule "that a false and defamatory publication regarding the acts of a
corporation are not libelous per se, unless the printed words import an indictable
offense involving moral turpitude, or such malevolence, misconduct or obloquy as
affects the financial standing of the corporation or occasions a pecuniary loss." Id. at
311 (quotation omitted). The court further noted, however, that:
To merely attack or challenge the rectitude of the officers or members of
a corporation, and hold them or either of them up to scorn, hatred,
contempt, or obloquy for acts done in their official capacity, or which
would render them liable to criminal prosecution, does not give the
corporation a right of action for libel.
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would have to plead more than ridicule of its officers to recover
damages in a civil action for libel.8 2 With this principle in mind,
the court did not even consider Article Ten of the European
Convention.8
Sitting without ajury, the court found, nonetheless, that some
of the defendant's statements defamed the Council. 4 After considering and rejecting the defenses of privilege, justification, and
fair comment, the court awarded the plaintiff damages in the
amount of £2000 and enjoined the defendant from further pamphleteering.8 5 By extending a corporation's right to maintain a libel action to a governmental authority, the Bognor Regis court
86
disregarded the divisional court's ruling in Manchester Corp.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court concluded that because the advertisement and
the article, when read as a whole, implied that the plaintiff was trying to gain an
unfair advantage over its competitors, the complaint set forth a cause of action. Id. at
311-12.
82 Bognor Regis, [1972] 2 Q.B. at 175.
83 See id. at 169-78 (deciding the case without reference to the European
Convention).
84 Id. at 178.
85 Id. The BognorRegis court was particularly influenced by the holding in National
Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian. Id. at 173. See supranotes 62-65 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Gillian. Interestingly, the implementation of
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 revoked the right of a trade union
to pursue an action in libel. See Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and
Plumbing Union v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1980] 1 Q.B. 585, 598-601 (1979) (noting
that with the enactment of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974, "Parliament has deprived the trade union of the necessary personality on which an action
for defamation depends"). See supra note 12 (defining the defenses of privilege,justification, and fair comment).
86 Bognor Regis, [1972] 2 Q.B. at 175-76. Similar to the hierarchal structure of
courts in the United States, courts in England adhere to the principle of stare decisis.
SIR JACOB, supra note 19, at 57. Thus, decisions of the High Court are binding upon
itself and upon High Court judges sitting alone. Police Auth. v. Watson, [1947] 1 KB.
842, 848. Contra Elderton v. United Kingdom Totalisator Co., [1945] 61 T.L.R. 529,
530 (Chancery Division judge declined to follow the decision of a Divisional Court of
the Queen's Bench Division).
The High Court and County Court are the lowest courts under the structure of
the British judicial system. JAcKsoN's, supra note 14, at 39. The High Court was created under the Judicature Acts of 1873-75 and currently consists of three divisions:
the Queen's Bench, the Chancery Division, and the Family Division. Id. The High
Court may generally hear any type of case unless a statute requires a case to be
brought in the county court. Id. at 36. Litigants in the High Court may appeal to the
Court of Appeal, the second tier in the English court system. Id. at 39, 90. In England and Northern Ireland, the House of Lords is the final appellate court for both
civil and criminal matters. Id. at 94. For an overview of the British court system, see
generally id. at 30-68, 90-104.
Mindful of this policy of stare decisis, Mr. Justice Browne distinguished the case
at hand from the decision in Manchester Corp. Bognor, [1972] 2 Q.B. at 175-78. See
supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's reasoning in
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Although England's court of last appeal had never before addressed the question of whether a governmental entity could sue
for libel, the United States Supreme Court had already tackled the
issue in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan.8 7 Sullivan
involved a libel action brought by L.B. Sullivan, the Commissioner
Manchester Corp. The Bognor Regis court proclaimed that the Manchester Corp. court's
holding-that a corporation may not sue for a libel affecting personal reputation-if
ever valid, had effectively been overruled by South Hetton Coal Company v. North-Eastern
News Association and National Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian. Id. at
177.
Mr. Justice Browne also criticized and rejected a second principle propounded in
Manchester Corp. Id. That principle, the court noted, stated that because a corporation could not be guilty of corruption, it necessarily followed that oral or written statements claiming the corporation had been guilty of corruption could not be
defamatory. Id. (citing South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News Ass'n, [1894] 1
Q.B. 133, 144). The Bognor Regis court then admonished that such a rule of law was
unsound and "'would not be upheld in the Court of Appeal.'" Id. (quotation
omitted).
87 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). Justice Brennan began his opinion by declaring that
this was the first time the Court had been called on to determine the possible constitutional limitations upon a state's power to award libel damages to a public official
suing those who had criticized his official conduct. Id.
The Supreme Court had, however, considered a similar question in Schenectady
Union PublishingCo. v. Sweeney. Eaton, supra note 6, at 1350 n.3 (citing Schenectady
Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942) (per curiam) (mem.)). In
Sweeney, the Supreme Court affirmed a Second Circuit opinion that reversed the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Sweeney v. Schenectady
Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288, 289 (2d Cir. 1941), affdper curiam, 316 U.S. 642
(1942) (mem.). The plaintiff in Sweeney, a congressional representative, claimed that
the defendant's publication of an article libeled him. Id. The article, published in
the widely circulated newspaper, the Schenectady Union Star,discussed a priest's effort
to prevent the appointment of ajudge to the United States District Court because the
judge was Jewish and not born in the United States. Id. at 289-90. The article further
stated that Congressman Martin L. Sweeney, the plaintiff and chief congressional
spokesman for the priest, had called a caucus of Ohio representatives to protest the
appointment. Id. at 289. In declaring the complaint sufficient to state a cause of
action, the Second Circuit noted that when a false statement is made about a public
official, such accusations may "lead right-thinking people to believe him unworthy of
public trust and confidence" and are therefore libelous per se. Id. at 290 (citation
omitted). Thus, because the article accused the Congressman of trying to deprive an
individual of appointment to a public office on the basis of race and religion, the
court concluded the plaintiff would become "an anathema" and a bigot, subject to the
scorn and contempt of society. Id. at 290-91.
For a discussion of Sullivan and its progeny, see generally Eaton, supra note 6, at
1364-1451; Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 782 (1986); Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libe Language, And Law: New York Times
v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1990); Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money,
No-FaultLibel Suit: Keeping Sullivan In Its ProperPlace, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1287 (1988);
Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1983); Frederick Schauer,
Fear,Risk And The First Amendment: Unravelling The "ChillingEffect", 58 B.U. L. REv.
685, 705-21 (1978).
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of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, against four AfricanAmerican clergymen and The New York Times.8 8 Sullivan alleged
that a paid advertisement concerning the civil rights movement,
submitted by the clergy and published by The New York Times on
March 29, 1960, defamed him by imputing to him certain inaccurately described actions.8 9
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan reversed the decision
of the Alabama Supreme Court9 ° and declared that the Alabama
courts' interpretation of the law was constitutionally deficient. 91
88 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. In his capacity as Commissioner of Public Affairs, Sullivan was charged with overseeing the Police Department, the Fire Department, the
Department of the Cemetery, and the Department of Scales. Id.
89 Id. at 256-59. The editorial advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices,"
was signed by sixty-four widely known persons and leveled several charges of terrorism
against the police department. Id. at 256, 257. The falsity of some of the statements
was uncontroverted. Id. at 258. The advertisement charged, for instance, that nine
students at a local college had been expelled for leading a march on the state capitol.
Id. at 258-59. In reality, the students were expelled for participating in an illegal
lunch counter sit-in. Id. at 259. The advertisement also claimed that when the students protested the expulsions and refused to re-register, the police padlocked the
dining hall of the college in an attempt to starve the students into submission. Id. at
257. Once again, such an action had never occurred. Id. at 259. A large number of
the students had protested the expulsion, but only by boycotting classes for a day. Id.
Sullivan alleged that the third paragraph of the advertisement, which stated in
part that "truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama
State College Campus," could be imputed to him because he was the Commissioner
of the Police. Id. at 257, 258. Sullivan further charged that the sixth paragraph of the
advertisement implied that he was responsible for bombing the home of Dr. Martin
Luther King and for harassing Dr. King by continuously arresting him. Id. at 257-58.
Justice Brennan maintained, however, that such erroneous statements were inevitable
in a democratic society and added that "[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate." Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128
F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)) (footnote omitted).
90 New York Times v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (Ala. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a jury award to Sullivan of $500,000
against The New York Times. Id. at 28, 52.
91 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264. The Court determined that the Alabama courts' application of traditional libel law to a case involving a public official suing those who
criticized his official conduct neglected to adequately protect freedom of speech and
freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at
265. Moreover, the Court rejected the Alabama Supreme Court's terse dismissal of
The Times's constitutional contentions. Id. The Court determined that the Alabama
Supreme Court had misguidedly relied upon a previous United States Supreme Court
ruling, which held that statements protesting official conduct contained in a paid
advertisement were not constitutionally protected. Id. at 265 (citing Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52-54 (1942)). The Court pronounced that the critical
issue was not whether the allegedly libelous statements in Valentine were published in
a paid advertisement. Id. at 266. Rather, the Court stated that the focus should be
whether the statements were for purely commercial purposes, which would not be
afforded First Amendment protection, or whether the statements were expressions of
opinion, which would be constitutionally safeguarded. Id.

1570

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1549

The Court proclaimed that without proof of "actual malice," defined as a statement made with "knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," a state cannot
award general damages to a public official for libelous statements
relating to his official conduct.9 2 Justice Brennan asserted that
First Amendment protections do not turn upon the popularity, social utility, or truth of the beliefs and ideas involved.9 3 Rather, the
Justice explained, such protections are founded upon the theory
that false statements are an inevitable consequence of free debate
which must be safeguarded if such freedom is to survive.9 4 Accordingly, the Court explained that such protections cease only where
The Court predicated its decision on the fundamental proposition that "debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
92 Id. at 279-80, 283. Prior to 1825, America adhered to the principle that "malice"
was an essential element in a cause of action for libel. Eaton, supra note 6, at 1353
n.15. Eventually, however, American courts followed Britain's lead, and the pleading
of malice became a mere formality. Id. Only when dealing with issues relating to
punitive damages and the availability of privileged defenses did the courts require a
showing of malice. Id.
The American common law of defamation derived from English common law.
Jamie D. Batterman, Comment, The First Amendment Protection of the Freedoms of Speech
and the Press and its Effect on the Law of Defamation as Seen Through the Eyes of Justice
Brennan: His Impact and its Future, 13 WHrIER L. REv. 233, 235 (1992) (footnote
omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one
which "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Much like their English counterparts, American courts offered some defendants protection for statements that were
either absolutely or conditionally qualified. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 114-16, at
815-42; see also Eaton, supra note 6, at 1360-63 (distinguishing among the multifarious
exceptions to the common law rule of strict liability).
Although the exceptions were likely prompted by the First Amendment's proclamation of freedom of expression, their development was not advanced by any express
constitutional declarations. Id. at 1363. It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court
decreed that the First Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that
although freedom of speech and the press are protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, it is fundamental that this freedom is not absolute).
Even after this recognition, however, the Supreme Court refused to extend First
Amendment protection to defamatory falsehoods. Eaton, supra note 6, at 1364; see
also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (noting that "the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance"); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 266 (1952) (maintaining that libelous utterances are not protected by the First
Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include . . .the libelous .
93
94

. . .")

(footnote omitted).

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
Id. at 271-72 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 433).
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actual malice occurs.9 5
Against the backdrop of scattershot British judicial precedent
in the libel area and the strict American approach of New York
Times v. Sullivan, emerged the decision of Britain's House of Lords
in Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd.9 6 The issue,
narrowly framed, was whether a local authority had the right to
maintain a suit for defamatory words pertaining to its governmen95 Id. at 279-80. Moreover, the Sullivan Court declined to venture "how far down
into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would
extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who
would or would not be included." Id. at 283 n.23 (citation omitted). Subsequent
cases, however, have elaborated on the public official designation. Eaton, supra note
6, at 1375-81 (footnotes omitted).
For example, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court expanded the definition of public
official to include anyone having substantial responsibility for the conduct of a government's affairs. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). In Rosenblatt, a former
supervisor of a county recreational facility brought a civil libel action against a newspaper columnist who published a column criticizing the fiscal management of the
area under Rosenblatt's supervision. Id. at 77, 78-79. Although the column did not
mention Rosenblatt by name, a jury award of damages was upheld by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Id. at 77, 79. The United States Supreme Court, in a decision
once again written by Justice Brennan, reversed the decision of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court and remanded the case. Id. at 77, 88. Mindful of the fact that when
Rosenblatt went to trial the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan had not yet been
handed down, the Court nonetheless decided that the trial judge should have made a
determination of whether there was sufficient proof to show that Rosenblatt was a
public official. Id. at 87-88.
One year later, the Court extended the definition to include "public figures" as
well as officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Moreover,
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., the Supreme Court further abandoned the distinction between public and private people in public figure libel cases. Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971). Justice Brennan, writing the Court's plurality opinion, extended the actual malice standard of Sullivan to defamatory falsehoods
relating to private persons if the statements concerned matters of general or public
interest. Id. at 30, 43. Justice Brennan focused on society's interest in such matters,
noting that "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some
sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved." Id. at 43.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., however, the Court retreated somewhat by refusing
to apply the Sullivan standard to media defamation of private individuals even though
the published statements involved an issue of general or public interest. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974). The Court reasoned that applying Sullivan in such a manner would unacceptably abridge the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation. Id. at 346.
Additionally, the Court toughened Sullivan's recklessness standard in St. Amant v.
Thompson by ruling that recklessness was not to be measured by a reasonable man
standard. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Rather, the Court stated
that recklessness was to be measured by the subjective standard of whether the defendant in the case subjectively entertained doubts about the truth of his statements.
Id.
96 1993 App. Cas. 534.
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tal and administrative functions.9 7 Writing for a unanimous court,
Lord Keith of Kinkel, however, chose to address the broader question of whether a municipal corporation could sue for libel under
any circumstances.9"
Accordingly, the House first paid deference to the long-standing rule that a trading corporation may bring an action for defamatory words that impinge on its business functions.9 9 In so doing,
the Lordships disagreed with the Bognor Regis court's interpretation
of South Hetton.10 ° The House of Lords explained that South Hetton
did not, as the Bognor Regis court had interpreted, stand for the
proposition that a trading corporation can maintain a suit with respect to actions that do not damage its business.'
Rather, the
House of Lords clarified, South Hetton supported the proposition
that a trading corporation is entitled to sue only for defamatory
words that traduce its business functions.10 2 Furthermore, the
House submitted that the same principles applied to charitable organizations, trade unions, and perhaps even local governmental
1 3
entities. 1
Nevertheless, the House emphasized that certain characteristics unique to a local authority precluded automatic application of
libel principles developed with regard to corporations, whether
trading or non-trading.10 4 Foremost among these characteristics,
the House asserted, was that a local authority is a democratically
elected governmental body."0 5 As such, the House declared, public
importance demanded that the authority hold itself open to unfet06
tered public criticism.1
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 542.
99 Id. at 547. For example, the House opined that statements that reflect negatively on a corporation's financial status, possibly deterring banks from extending it
credit, would tend to damage a trading corporation's business and are actionable. Id.
In addition, the lord noted that allegations regarding the working conditions of its
employees, which not only might make people reluctant to do business with the corporation, but also might deter the best qualified workers from applying for employment, are also actionable. Id. (citing South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News
Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133 (C.A. 1893)).
100 Id. at 545-47, 551. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
South Hetton decision).
101 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 547.
102 Id.
103 Id. The House recognized that certain defamatory statements might have the
effect of dissuading qualified potential employees from applying for jobs, which in
turn might curtail the government authority's efficiency. Id.
97
98

104 Id.
105
106

Id.
Id.

1994]

NOTE

1573

The House buttressed this conviction by citing the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in City of Chicago v. Tribune Co.'1 7 Lord
Keith of Kinkel noted that the Illinois Supreme Court, after considering English and American libel law,10 8 approached defamation of
a public entity solely with the intention of advancing public policy
and fundamental principles of government in concluding that the
city of Chicago could not maintain a libel action for damages. 10 9
The House of Lords then observed that the United States Supreme
107 Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill. 1923)). The
city of Chicago, the plaintiff in Tribune, brought suit against a newspaper company for
publishing articles that alleged that the city was in financial straits. Tribune, 139 N.E.
at 86. Chief Justice Thompson's decision contained the following account of the
articles:
[I]n various articles appearing from time to time in 1920 [the Tribune
Company] charged that the city was 'broke'; that it 'owes millions of
1921 funds'; that 'bankruptcy is just around the corner from the city of
Chicago'; that 'its credit is shot to pieces'; that 'the city is headed for
bankruptcy unless it makes immediate retrenchments'; that 'the city's
financial affairs are in a serious way'; that 'it is the issue between this
Tammany government, which has bankrupted the treasury of the city of
Chicago, which is in default to the city creditors'; that the city administration, 'having busted the city, and having reduced it to such insolvency that it is issuing Villa script to pay its bills, is reaching out for the
state'; that the administration 'is paying city debts with city hall script,
and we have just begun to feel the effects of being busted'; that 'Chicago is drifting into a receivership'; that 'the city is hurrying on to bankruptcy, and is threatened with a receivership for its revenue'; that the
city 'is bankrupt, and the banks of the city have refused it credit'; that
'the city government has run on the rocks'; that 'the city cannot pay its
debts; it is bankrupt; the bankers have refused it credit'-and divers
other similar false and defamatory statements.
Id. See supra note 39 (discussing Tribune).
108 Tribune, 139 N.E. at 87-90 (citations omitted). The Tribune court stressed that
although the American law of libel once followed British precedent, the United States
no longer recognized the crime of seditious libel. Id. at 88-89. In fact, the court
claimed, it was the desire to free themselves from the oppression of seditious libel that
inspired many of the American colonists to revolt. Id. at 87.
American citizens view free press in spite of its flaws as necessary to the process of
self-government and public debate. Prosser, supranote 6, at 345. This philosophy has
been recognized since the infancy of the United States, when former PresidentJames
Madison declared that "some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press." 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrrU-ION 546, 571 (1836).
109 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 547-48 (quoting Tribune, 139 N.E. at 90). The Tribune court declined to differentiate between the governmental and proprietary functions of a city. Tribune, 139 N.E. at 91. Instead, the court proclaimed the right of a
citizen, or of any entity, to criticize actions of the government free from fear of civil or
criminal prosecution. Id. at 90. Emphasizing that the "American system of government is founded upon the fundamental principle that the citizen is the fountain of all
authority," the Tribune court held that the action was "out of tune with the American
spirit, and [had] no place in Americanjurisprudence." Id. at 90, 91. For an additional
discussion of Tribune, see supra note 39.
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Court, in the seminal case New York Times v. Sullivan, endorsed the
propositions forwarded in Tribune. 1 ° Though cognizant of the fact
that Sullivan and Tribune were primarily applicable to American
First Amendment considerations, the law lords contended that the
underlying public policy factors were equally valid in Great Britain.1 1 ' Addressing these factors, Lord Keith of Kinkel articulated
that "the chilling effect" on freedom of speech resulting from the
threat of a civil action for libel could not be taken lightly. 1 2 Elaborating on this principle, the House speculated that there might be
instances in which certain facts, known to be true, would justify
publication of defamatory information although admissible evidence of truth is unavailable." 3
110 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 548 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277 (1964)). See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
New York Times v. Sullivan.
111 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 548. The Derbyshire House additionally relied upon
the decision in Die Spoorbond v. South African Railways. Id. at 549-50 (citation omitted).
In Die Spoorbond, the DerbyshireHouse noted, the Supreme Court of South Africa held
that a governmental department, responsible for running South Africa's railway system, was not permitted to maintain a defamation action against a publication that
allegedly injured its governmental reputation. Id. at 549 (quotation omitted). Thus,
the Derbyshire House implied, it appears that where the judiciary, regardless of the
country, has weighed competing public interests, the judgment is always the same. Id.
at 539. Governmental entities, the House therefore concluded, cannot maintain an
action pertaining to their governmental reputation. Id. at 550.
112 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 548.
113 Id. As a result, the House concluded, the press might be inhibited from publishing desirable public information. Id. (quoting Hector v. Attorney-General of Antigua
& Barbuda, [1990] 2 App. Cas. 312, 318 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Ant. & Barb.)).
The Sullivan Court expressed a similar concern, stating that "would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). In the United States, this principle is commonly
known as the "chilling effect" doctrine, first coined by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The chilling effect doctrine is defined as: "In constitutional law, any law or practice which has the effect of seriously discouraging the exercise of a constitutional right ....
The deterrent effect of governmental action that
falls short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (6th ed. 1990).
In Hector v. Attorney-General of Antigua and Barbuda, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council decided whether a criminal conviction could stand against a newspaper
editor charged with publishing an article that violated section 33B of the Public Order Act of 1972, as amended by the Public Order (Amendment) Act of 1976. Hector,
[19901 2 App. Cas. at 313, 314, 316. Section 33B provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law any person who-(a) in
any public place or at any public meeting makes any false statement; or
(b) prints or distributes any false statement which is likely to cause fear
or alarm in or to the public, or to disturb the public peace, or to undermine public confidence in the conduct of public affairs, shall be guilty
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After addressing the public policy factors, the law lords noted
that the Court of Appeal relied on Article Ten of the European
Convention in reaching the same conclusion, namely that a local
authority was not entitled to maintain an action in libel. 114 The law
lords articulated that certain rights available to private individuals
cannot be exercised by governmental entities absent a showing of
public interest.1 1 5 Lord Keith of Kinkel then indicated that no
compelling social need existed meriting the extension of a corporation's right to sue in libel to a municipal corporation seeking to
protect its reputation. 16 Indeed, the lord illuminated, the mere
fact that only two known cases had been filed in the past century
17
supported that very proposition.'
of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not
exceeding 500 dollars or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six
months.
Hector, [1990] 2 App. Cas. at 316 (quoting Public Order Act, 1972 § 33B). Quashing
the criminal proceedings against Hector, the Privy Council stressed that it was highly
suspicious of statutory provisions that criminalize statements likely to subvert the public's confidence in the government's conduct of public affairs. Hector, [1990] 2 App.
Cas. at 318, 319-20. The Privy Council even scolded that "[any attempt to stifle or
fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable kind." Id.
114 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 551.
115 Id. at 549 (citing Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1990]
1 App. Cas. 109 (1988)).
116 Id. at 551 (citations omitted). Lord Keith of Kinkel noted that the balancing
test performed by the Court of Appeal, as per the requirements of the European
Convention, further verified declining the extension of a government authority's
right to sue. Id.; see also Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 416, 418 (1986)
(finding that the signatories of the European Convention must assess whether a
"pressing social need" exists warranting restrictions on speech) (footnote omitted).
In Lingens, the retiring Chancellor and President of the Austrian Socialist Party
pursued a private prosecution under Austria's criminal laws against Mr. Lingens, the
editor of a magazine; the prosecution accused the Chancellor in two articles of protecting former Nazi SS members for political reasons. Id. at 408, 409, 411. The European Court determined that its inquiry should not be confined to whether the
interference with speech was permitted under the second paragraph of Article Ten of
the European Convention, which permitted restrictions on speech if aimed at such
goals as "'national security .... public safety .... the prevention of disorder or crime,
...
[or] the protection of the reputation or rights of others . .. .'" Id. at 416-17
(quoting European Convention, supra note 3, art. 10, at 230). Rather, the European
Court pronounced that it must determine whether the interference with speech was
in proportion to the stated goal, and whether the reasons offered by the Austrian
courts were sufficient to justify the objective. Id. at 418 (footnote omitted). Consequently, although the European Court agreed with the Austrian government's contention that Lingens's conviction was designed to protect "'the reputation or rights of
others,'" it was both an unnecessary remedy in a democratic society and a disproportionate remedy to the legitimate aim sought. Id. at 417, 421 (quoting European Convention, supra note 3, art. 10, at 230).
117 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 551; see Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council v. Cam-
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Opining that Bognor Regis had been wrongly decided, the
House ultimately concluded that that case should be overruled. 1 8
The House, enunciating that its decision was grounded on common law principles, found no need, therefore, to rely upon the
European Convention.1 19 Nevertheless, Lord Keith of Kinkel expressed pleasure that the common law of England was in accord
with the European Convention in this particular field. 120 Thus, the
House of Lords unanimously dismissed the county council's
appeal.

1 21

Until Derbyshire, English libel law clung to principles from the
Middle Ages. 122 In fact, many commentators, both in the United
States and abroad, have long been calling for English libel reform. 1 23 Prior to Derbyshire, English law apparently afforded plaintiffs easy victory in libel actions.' 24 Indeed, some plaintiffs
purposely filed suit in England, knowing that its strict liability standard was more favorable than their own countries' laws. 1 25 Now,
however, the House of Lords finally appears to be moving towards
pion, [1972] 2 Q.B. 169; Mayor, Aldermen, & Citizens of Manchester v. Williams,
[1891] 1 Q.B. 94 (1890).
118 Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 551.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 BARE-rr ET AL., supra note 1, at 1197.
123 See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 6, at 338-39 & n.11 (noting that libel reform in
England is especially needed in the area of appellate review ofjury awards) (citations
omitted); A Swallow Can Make A Summer, 139 NEW L.J. 741, 741 (1989) (calling for a
speedy reform of Britain's libel laws). Similarly, scholars in the United States advocate reform in this country. See, e.g., David A. Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgmentsfor Libel: A
Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REv. 847 passim (1986) (stating that limitless damage
awards in libel actions have created a crisis in the United States, and advocating that
parties to libel actions should have the option of declaratory relief in an effort to stem
the large amount of damages awarded to public officials and public figures); Epstein,
supra note 87, at 815 (recommending a return to the strict liability approach to libel);
Marc A. Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REv.
809 passim (1986) (promoting legislative creation of a declaratory judgment remedy
to libel actions, and setting forth a proposed "Plaintiff's Option Libel Reform Act");
Leval, supra note 87, at 1291-1302 (championing the development of a no-money, nofault libel suit as a means of restoring a falsely damaged reputation without requiring
the plaintiff to meet the obstacles of the Sullivan test or the defendant to undergo the
effort of litigating a Sullivan issue).
124 Prosser, supra note 6, at 342 (footnote omitted).
125 Don J. DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad-Libel Plaintiffs Say It's Easier Suing U.S. Media Elsewhere, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 38. When the former Prime Minister of Greece,
Andreas Papandreou, decided to institute a suit against Time magazine over an article
linking him to a $200 million bank scandal, his American attorney filed the action in
England. Id. The attorney, Leonard B. Boudin, candidly admitted that he did not
sue in the United States because "'the English law of libel is much more favorable
than the American law of libel.'" Id. Furthermore, Boudin remarked, "[t]he Prime
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a more enlightened approach.12 6
Although the Derbyshire court did not go so far as to apply the
"actual malice" standard of Sullivan, the House of Lords at least
recognized that in a democratic society, individuals must be free to
express criticism about the government openly, 127 principles long
recognized in the United States. 128 It is encouraging that the
House of Lords did more than summarily reject relevant American
case law. 129 The House of Lords was undoubtedly swayed in its determination because of its recognition that Sullivan and Tribune
130
were sound decisions in accordance with English common law.
Derbyshire signals a new leaf in the history of English libel law
that is long overdue. It is possible that the embarrassing defeats in
matters of free expression that the United Kingdom has suffered in
recent years at the hands of the European Court has instilled in the
House of Lords a realization that it had to update its thinking to
keep step with much of the world.13 ' Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that the decision in Derbyshire will have widespread significance, unless the House of Lords adopts wholeheartedly the
"actual malice" standard of Sullivan. 3 2 Absent any Parliamentary
Minister, as a public figure, would have had a much harder go at it in the United
States" under the "actual malice" standard of Sullivan. Id.
Even though American journalists fear the English law of libel, some commentators have noted that the amount of damages awarded in Great Britain is often substantially smaller than that awarded in the United States. Lewis, supra note 87, at 615-16
(footnote omitted).
126 Lewis, supra note 20, at A16 (noting that the decision of the House of Lords in
Derbyshire signalled an important movement in the Lords' philosophy towards the
American view of free expression, thus "bridging the gap that has long existed between our two cultures").
127 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1993 App. Cas. 534, 547.
128 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill. 1923). In fact, the
Tribune court noted, one of the reasons American colonists revolted was to obtain
freedom from the crown's oppression. Id. at 87.
129 See Derbyshire, 1993 App. Cas. at 547-48.
130 Id. at 547-48, 551.
'31 See, e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
10, 11, 31 (1978) (holding that the United Kingdom had violated Article Ten of the
European Convention under the guise of ensuring national security when it enjoined
a newspaper from publishing excerpts from a memoir, already published in the
United States and Australia, and widely discussed elsewhere, that contained intimate
details about the operation and activities of the British Security Service); Observer &
Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991) (same); Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27, 45 (1978) (holding that a
violation of Article Ten had occurred when a newspaper was restrained, under threat
of contempt of court, from publishing a series of articles on the plight of children
born with birth defects who were parties to pending, though long dormant, litigation). For a more detailed discussion of the first Sunday Times case, see supra note 17.
132 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining "actual

1578

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

direction, either in the form of a Bill
of Rights or a specific statute,
133
such progress might never occur.
Sarah Obaditch Kambour

malice" as a statement made with "knowledge that it was false or made with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not").
133 See Watson, supra note 19, at 704 (explaining that British courts are loathe to act
without Parliamentary direction).

